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The Implications of Climate Change Litigation 
for International Environmental Law-Making 
David Hunter1
 
 Everyone is talking about climate change.  Climate change has been on the cover of 
almost every U.S. magazine in the past year, including Vanity Fair, Time, Newsweek, the 
Economist, and even Sports Illustrated, on such television shows as Oprah and The Tonight Show, 
and in the movie theatres with Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and Who Killed the Electric Car?.  
To be sure, this media attention is driven first by the increasingly clear scientific connection 
between greenhouse gas concentrations, climate change, and real impacts affecting real people.  But 
the growing public awareness of climate change is also being driven by the actions of lawyers and 
other climate advocates who are increasingly raising climate change in the world’s courts, 
commissions and congresses.  Climate change even made an appearance before the US Supreme 
Court.2   Win or lose (and some will surely win as they did in the US Supreme Court), these 
litigation strategies are significantly changing and enhancing the public dialogue around climate 
change.  
 This chapter discusses these awareness-building impacts of climate litigation as well as 
related impacts such strategies may have on the development of climate law and policy—even if 
many of the individual cases lose. 3  The chapter does not discuss the significant implications if a 
tort action in the United States or the Inuit human rights claims, for example, were ultimately to 
prevail. Such precedents, which would obviously be far reaching, are discussed in the various 
chapters of this book addressing each strategy.  The primary focus here is on the implications of the 
climate litigation strategies simply by virtue of their having been filed.  In fact, the debate over 
whether specific theories will prevail or what remedies can be fashioned in a specific case misses 
                                                 
1Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Program on International and Comparative Environmental Law, 
American University Washington College of Law. Address: 4801 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, 
DC 20016. Email:  Dhunter@wcl.american.edu. Tel:  202.274.4415.  The author thanks Wil Burns and 
Hari Osofsky for their helpful edits of this paper.  The paper will be published in H. OSOFSY & W. BURNS, 
EDS.,  ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CONTROL:  SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES 
(forthcoming Cambridge Press, 2007). 
2 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007). 
3 See also Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Global Climate Change Policy:  The 
Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in H. OSOFSY & W. BURNS, EDS.,  ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CONTROL:  SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (forthcoming 
Cambridge Press, 2007) (discussing how climate change actions by states can strengthen their political 
influence in the climate debate); JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION:  
ANALYSING THE LAW, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE & IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH & PROPERTY 12 
(2006) (noting public awareness-building impact and motivation of some of the climate litigation). 
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much of the significance of these litigation strategies.   Just the acts of preparing, announcing, filing, 
advocating and forcing a response have significant impacts—and of course some will prevail. 
 Climate advocates are necessarily pushing the development of the law in new directions.  
The world’s legal systems—both international and national—have never seen a challenge quite like 
climate change.  The science involves complexities of global ecology that are of a scale new to the 
courts.   Nearly all of our activities, whether as individuals, corporations, or governments, 
contribute to the problem and almost everyone is affected.  The entire world is at once 
simultaneously both a potential plaintiff and defendant.  Climate change presents significant 
geographic complexities, with significant implications for jurisdiction and the shaping of remedies. 
4   Climate change also presents difficult temporal problems, with emissions today mixing with 
emissions from yesterday to cause impacts in the future.  This geographic and temporal distance 
between the wrongs (for example, the emissions) and the injuries presents new challenges for law.  
 The unique aspects of climate change have forced climate advocates to innovate and to 
develop creative new strategies internationally and domestically.  They have had to push for the 
progressive development of the law and related institutions, emphasizing not only the differences 
but the similarities of climate change with more familiar issues.  Viewed in this light, climate 
change is just another, albeit distinctly modern, common law nuisance, threat to cultural property, 
or human rights violation.  In this respect, the climate change advocates are right:  climate change 
may be global, it may be complex, but climate change is also strikingly familiar.  Real people, 
typically those already marginalized with few resources, will suffer real harm because of the 
activities of others.  Isn’t this precisely what the law is meant to address?  
 
1.  The Focus on Victims 
 
 Indeed, climate advocates’ focus on specific injuries in specific situations has far-reaching 
implications for climate policy more generally.   In the Kyoto negotiations or in previous national 
climate policy debates, the focus has primarily been on climate change’s global impacts:  average 
temperature increases, average sea level rise, average changes in precipitation.  With the rise of 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation:  Implications for Transnational 
Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005); Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge?: 
Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, in H. OSOFSY & W. BURNS, EDS.,  
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CONTROL:  SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES 
(forthcoming Cambridge Press, 2007); see also Kirsten Engels, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation 
Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law 
Remedies,  Ariz. Legal Stud. Discussion Paper No. 07-10, 155 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968990.  
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climate litigation strategies, however, the focus necessarily shifts to the specific injuries being 
asserted by the plaintiffs or claimants:  the impacts on New England’s ski industry,5 California’s 
coastline,6 the life and culture of the Inuit,7 the survival of polar bears or penguins,8 or the grandeur 
of Mount Everest or Glacier National Park.9   
 Advocates have had to compile and present detailed assessments of climate impacts in 
ways that highlight the many regional and local impacts of climate change.  In Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power, for example, the New England states documented impacts that 
included declining snow pack and ice; increased loss of life and public health threats from heat-
related illnesses and smog; impacts on the San Francisco Bay, Jamaica Bay National Wildlife 
Refuge and other coastal resources from storm surges and permanent sea-level rise; declining 
water levels in the Great Lakes; increases in temperatures in the upper surfaces of the Great 
Lakes; and rapid declines in forest resources, including New York’s Adirondack State Park, 
among other regionally specific allegations.10  Similarly, California, in California v. General 
Motors, details impacts of global warming that are already occurring in California and related 
costs the state is incurring in response.  These impacts include, for example, a decline in snow 
pack in the Sierra Nevada range due to an increase in average winter temperatures; the costs of 
re-building levees to prevent sea water infiltration and other impacts of sea level rise on the 
                                                 
5 Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 Civ. 
5669(LAP)) [hereinafter Connecticut v. AEP Complaint]. 
6 Complaint, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter 
California v. Gen. Motors Complaint]. 
7 See Center for International Environmental Law, An Inuit Petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights for Dangerous Impacts of Climate Change at 35-69 (2004), available at 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/COP10_Handout_EJCIEL.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Petition] (describing 
impacts on “every aspect of Inuit life and culture”). 
8 Center for Biological Diversity, Petition to List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as Threatened under the 
Endangered Species Act before the Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/SPECIES/polarbear/petition.pdf [hereinafter Polar Bear 
Petition]; Center for Biological Diversity, Petition to List 12 Penguin Species under the Endangered 
Species Act before the Secretary of the Interior (Nov. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/SPECIES/penguins/PenguinPetition.pdf [hereinafter Penguin 
Petition]. 
9 See, e.g., Petition to the World Heritage Committee for Inclusion of the Waterton-Glacier International 
Peace Park on the List of World Heritage in Danger and for Protective Measures and Actions (Feb. 16, 
2006), available at http://law.lclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/Waterton-GlacierPetition2.15.06.pdf [hereinafter 
Waterton-Glacier UNESCO Petition].  Other petitions were filed to list the MesoAmerican Barrier Reef in 
Belize, Huarascán National Park in Peru, Sagarmatha National Park in Nepal, and the Great Barrier Reef in 
Australia.  See Climate Justice Programme, UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions Presented (Nov. 17, 2004), 
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release [hereinafter UNESCO Petitions].   
See generally UNESCO, World Heritage Centre, Predicting and Managing the Effects of Climate Change 
on World Heritage, WHC-06/30.COM/7.1, Annex 4 (June 26, 2006) [hereinafter World Heritage Climate 
Report]. 
10 Connecticut v. AEP Complaint, supra note 5, at paras. 112-17, 121-27, 132-35. 
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Sacramento Bay-Delta; increased floods from earlier spring run-offs; and beach preservation 
efforts to reverse increased beach erosion from sea level rise.11
 This focus on specific injuries is critical for building political support; such cases link 
climate change with the lives of ordinary people.  Reports of a global increase in temperature of 1o 
or even 5o have little meaning to most people.  The impact is much more understandable when an 
Inuit expresses implications of climate change for their lives, when the glaciers of Nepal are 
melting, or when descriptions of drowning or cannibalistic polar bears are reported on the news.  
The Inuit human rights petition, for example, provides thirty-five pages on impacts of climate 
change on their life and culture.  The petition details changes in Arctic ice conditions and the 
resulting dangers for Inuit travel, the reduction in materials (thick ice) for building traditional 
igloos, and the deterioration of wildlife harvests because of declining populations of caribou, seals, 
polar bears and other animals.12  In short, the petition tells a story about the impacts of climate 
change in human terms far removed from the antiseptic discussion of GHG concentrations or global 
mean temperatures that have traditionally predominated international climate negotiations. 
 The story-telling quality of “cases” thus makes climate change more tangible and more 
immediate, which significantly changes the tone of the climate debate.13  If real victims—such as 
islanders or the Inuit—are in a room pressing their stories, it is harder for others to bluster about 
how climate change is a hoax or is unimportant because some regions may benefit from warming or 
will be able to adapt relatively easily.  At the very least, addressing climate change takes on a 
renewed urgency when one moves from the abstraction of sea level rise, for example, to questions 
of how to treat climate refugees from South Pacific islands or how to shore up the eroding 
California coastline.  A focus on victims increases the saliency of questions about compensation 
and adaptation to climate change, and the urgency of mitigating climate change to avoid even worse 
impacts in the future.14  This builds momentum at both the national and international levels for 
stronger climate policy making. 
 
2.  Implications for Climate Policy 
 2.1 Implications for Climate Science 
                                                 
11 California v. Gen. Motors Complaint, supra note 6, at paras. 46-56. 
12  Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 35-69. 
13 The story-telling or narrative quality of cases has spawned significant scholarship.  See, e.g., Daniel A. 
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
807 (1993); PETER BROOKS & PAUL GEWIRTZ, LAW’S STORIES:  NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 
(1996); GARY BELLOW & MARTHA MINOW, LAW STORIES (1996).  
14 See infra Section 2.2 (discussing impacts of litigation strategies on the development of international 
climate policy). 
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 Climate litigation’s focus on victims and on specific impacts has implications for how we 
use climate science and on what climate science is conducted.  Every litigation strategy requires the 
collection, synthesis, and presentation of climate science in support of its claims.  This process 
highlights and makes more accessible to a wider audience the expanding research and analysis on 
specific local and regional climate impacts.    
This is proven particularly true of the reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC),15 which have been cited as the scientific basis by most of the climate 
plaintiffs or petitioners. 16  The IPCC reports attract particular attention because they compile and 
summarize the international consensus on climate science at a specific point in time.  Moreover, the 
IPCC’s practice of explicitly bounding its views of the likelihood of certain scientific conclusions in 
terms of numeric probabilities not only assists international policymakers at the UNFCCC, but also 
offers lawyers scientific conclusions that are useful in explaining and meeting the standards for 
causation.  This reliance on the IPCC’s reports presents a two-way validation: the IPCC’s prestige 
and international status provides a convenient and effective affirmation of the claimant’s factual 
allegations (at least with respect to global climate trends) and, at the same time, use of the IPCC 
(and particularly its acceptance, if it ensues, by other institutions as authoritative) adds legitimacy 
and prestige to the IPCC and its reports.  This has been evidenced by the enormous, mostly positive 
media attention the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment has received since the beginning of its release in 
2007, and the dominant role it now plays in public discourse over climate science.  One can also 
expect that the Fourth Assessment will be central to the next generation of climate cases and claims.  
Although some may argue that the IPCC’s reports are not meant to be used for direct advocacy in 
specific cases, the IPCC’s screening and presentation of the emerging scientific provides an 
important service in allowing litigants and adjudicators alike to ground advocacy strategies and 
opinions in the current scientific consensus.    
The IPCC reports are not the only scientific studies to play a significant role in climate 
litigation.  The Inuit Petition, for example, relied heavily on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 
a comprehensive regional report released by the Arctic Council and International Arctic Science 
                                                 
15 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), available at http://ipcc-
wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_SPM.pdf, [hereinafter IPCC, 2007 PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS]; IPCC, 
WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTION, AND VULNERABILITY 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/spm13apr07.pdf . 
16 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1448-49; California v. Gen. Motors Complaint, supra note 
6, at paras. 24, 26, 31; Connecticut v. AEP Complaint, supra note 5, at paras 80, 88, 92-93. 
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Committee.17  That 2004 report concluded that the Arctic was “experiencing some of the most rapid 
and severe climate change on Earth.”18   California’s complaint against the automobile industry also 
highlighted the Assessment.19  Such use of the Assessment has helped to raise awareness of its 
findings in ways that would have been unlikely without it forming part of controversial and novel 
litigation strategies. 
 Climate litigation strategies not only rely on emerging science, but also will influence the 
development of climate science both directly and indirectly.  Some domestic climate cases in 
several countries have been filed with the goal of improving the assessment of climate impacts and 
the use of climate science.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the US Supreme Court required the 
government to make a reasoned judgment on whether emissions of carbon dioxide are endangering 
public health and welfare as an initial step in determining whether to regulate carbon dioxide as an 
air pollutant under the Clean Air Act.20 At the project level, cases in the United States,21 Germany22 
and Australia23 have sought (sometimes successfully) to require under national law the 
consideration of climate impacts in project finance or permitting. In Australia, for example, 
greenhouse gas emissions and resulting climate impacts must be assessed in coal mining and power 
plant operations, which presumably increases the scientific basis for decisionmaking in those 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 35; see also Int’l Arctic Science Comm. [IASC] & the Arctic 
Council, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Arctic Climate Assessment]. 
18California v. Gen. Motors Complaint, supra note 6, at para. 37 (quoting Arctic Climate Assessment, 
supra note 17). 
19 California v. Gen. Motors Complaint, supra note 6, at paras. 37-38.   
20 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1462-63; see also Coke Oven Envtl. Task Force v. EPA, No. 06-
1131 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 7, 2006) (pending challenge to EPA’s refusal to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions in setting new source performance standards under the Clean Air Act). 
21Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, No. C02-4106 JSW, 2007 WL 962955 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) 
(order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement and granting in part and denying in part 
defendants’ motion for summary judgement); Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C02-4106 JSW, 2005 
WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgement).   
22 See Press Release, GermanWatch & BUND, German Government Sued Over Climate Change (June 15, 
2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/german.suit/press.release.pdf (announcing lawsuit 
against the German Federal Ministry of Economics & Labour to compel disclosure of the climate change 
contribution made by those projects financed by the German export credit agency, Euler Hermes AG); Bund 
& Germanwatch v. German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour [BMWA], Beschluss, 
Verwaltungsgericht [VG Berlin] [Local Administrative Court] Jan. 10, 2006, VG 10 A 215.04 (2006), 
translated at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/Germany/de.export.decision.eng.doc. (order entering 
settlement with legal opinion).   
23 Australian Conservation Foundation v. Minister for Planning, Administrative Decision, (2004) VCAT 
2029 (holding that the Australian Planning and Environment Act requires consideration of greenhouse gas 
emissions and resulting climate impact in licensing coal mining and power plant operations); Wildlife 
Preservation Soc. of Queensland Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch v. Ministry for Environment & Heritage, 
(2006) FCA 736 (upholding decisions by the Australian environment ministry to license two coal mines, 
despite their failure to consider climate impacts on natural heritage sites).  For information on climate-
related cases brought in Australia, see the website of the Australian Climate Justice Program, available at 
http://www.cana.net.au/ACJP/cases.php?case_table=cases_aust (last visited at May 28, 2007). 
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sectors.24 A recent lawsuit in the United States is aimed at compelling the United States to complete 
a National Assessment of climate impacts, which was required by Congress to be completed by 
2004.25  Other U.S. cases seek to force the assessment of climate change impacts26 or the 
consideration of such impacts in permitting decisions.27  
 In other cases, expanding climate science may be an indirect or secondary outcome of the 
litigation effort.28  The petitions to the World Heritage Committee, for example, triggered a series 
of activities and reports that are aimed in part at reviewing the nature and scale of the risks posed to 
World Heritage properties arising specifically from climate change.29  More generally, climate 
litigation efforts may provide an incentive to some scientists to prioritize certain questions that they 
might otherwise ignore.  Questions of attribution, for example, become particularly relevant for 
litigation strategies aimed at securing compensation for those affected or for driving corrective 
action by identifying those responsible.30  The science of attribution is gaining ground; one recent 
study, for example, found that the human contribution to the 2003 European heat wave increased 
the potential of risk of such weather from 4 to 10 times.31  Approximately 22,000 to 35,000 people 
died from heat-related deaths, 75% of whom would have been likely to survive for more than a year 
without such heat.32  Such studies will be critical in shaping future climate litigation strategies. 
Finally, climate litigation is shaping the tone of the debate over climate science.  In 
journalistic or political approaches to climate, the views of climate skeptics were previously given 
equal weight to the broad consensus views regarding science.  In climate litigation forums, 
                                                 
24 Australian Conservation Foundation, VCAT 2029; see also Smith & Shearman, supra note 3 (discussing 
Australian Conservation Foundation). 
25 Complaint, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, No. C06-7061 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006). 
26 See, e.g., Watson, 2005 WL 2035596. 
27 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.r v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006) (opinion and order) 
(holding that plaintiff environmental organization had standing to challenge a permit application that would 
have permitted significant releases of a potent greenhouse gas (HCFC-142b)). 
28 See, e.g., Inuit Petition supra note 7, at 118 (seeking as one remedy that the “US take into account the 
impacts of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions on the Arctic and affected Inuit in evaluating and before 
approving all major government actions”); see also Bund & Germanwatch v. German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour [BMWA], Beschluss, Verwaltungsgericht [VG Berlin] [Local Administrative 
Court] Jan. 10, 2006, VG 10 A 215.04 (2006), translated at 
http://www.climatelaw.org/media/Germany/de.export.decision.eng.doc. 
(entering order requiring  Hermes to assess impacts of its financial decisions on climate change). 
29 See UNESCO, Announcement of World Heritage, Climate Change and World Heritage:  Expert Meeting, 
March 16-17, 2006, available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/events/301 (last visited Dec. 16, 2006). 
30 See, e.g., Myles Allen, Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007). 
31 Id.; see also Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change, NATURE, vol. 421, 891-92 (Feb. 27, 2003); Peter 
Stott, et al, Human Contribution to Europe Heat Wave of 2003, NATURE, vol. 432, at 610 (Dec. 2, 2004); 
Simone Bastianoni, Federico M. Pulselli & Enzo Tiezzi, The Problem of Assigning Responsibility for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 49 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 253 (2004) (discussing difficulties in assigning 
responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions). 
32 See Allen, supra note 30. 
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however, such skeptics may be asked to submit affidavits or even face cross-examination of their 
views.  This ground-truthing of climate science may screen out and discredit those fringe scientists 
whose positions may not be able to withstand the scrutiny that comes from adversarial proceedings, 
particularly in domestic courts.  To be sure, some opinions questioning the adequacy of climate 
science for judicial review have and will occur,33 but recent cases, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, are tending to support and recognize the general scientific 
consensus regarding climate change. 34  When courts and other highly credible institutions validate 
the basic science of climate change, the general public’s perception of the climate debate shifts from 
whether climate change is occurring to what the appropriate remedies should be.  For the public, 
Judicial decisions can move the debate from an esoteric one among scientists to an issue decided by 
impartial judges whose job it is to resolve such matters. 
 
2.2. Implications for the Climate Negotiations 
 
 Climate change litigation strategies have been at least partly a response to the perceived 
weakness of the international climate regime.  Initially, many of the litigation strategies were 
designed as an indirect response to the decisions by Australia and the United States to withdraw 
from the Kyoto Protocol.35  More recently, a Canadian environmental group filed a lawsuit 
asking the courts to declare Canada in noncompliance (or imminent noncompliance) with the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.36    The application for judicial review alleges that Canada’s 
Ministries of Environment and Health are in violation of Section 166 of the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, which requires them to act “ if the Ministers [Ministers of the 
Environment and Health] have reason to believe that a substance released from a source in 
Canada into the air creates, or may reasonably be anticipated to contribute to (a) air pollution in a 
                                                 
33 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1463- (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Re Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty 
Ltd & Ors, [2007] QLRT 33 (holding that plaintiffs had not proven a causal link between climate change 
and carbon emissions); Korsinsky v. EPA No. 05 Civ. 859 (NRB), 2005 WL 2414744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 
2005). 
34 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1455-58; see also, e.g., In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 
N.W.2d 794, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding Commission finding that carbon dioxide negatively 
affects the environment). 
35 See Burns, Introduction, in H. OSOFSY & W. BURNS, EDS.,  ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CONTROL:  SUB-
NATIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (forthcoming Cambridge Press, 2007). 
36 Application, Friends of the Earth v. Her Majesty the Queen, Minister of the Environment & Minister of 
Health, No. T-914-07 (Federal Court Ottawa, May 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.sierralegal.org/reports/notice_of_application07_05_29.pdf (application for judicial review of 
the Canadian government’s actions, emitting greenhouse gases, in violation of sect. 166 of the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol). 
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country other than Canada; or (b) air pollution that violates, or is likely to violate, an international 
agreement binding on Canada in relation to the prevention, control or correction of pollution.”37  
According to the application,  the Government of Canada’s own reports estimate that its actual 
emissions will be nearly 40% higher than that which is allowed under the Kyoto Protocol.38 
Although this is the first lawsuit in the world aimed specifically at enhancing compliance with the 
international climate regime, many of the other climate litigation strategies have also been 
designed at least in part to increase the political will for stronger international climate change 
policy.39    
 The litigation efforts thus should not be seen in isolation from the negotiations under the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.    The 
Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the UNFCCC and the Meetings of the Parties (MoP) to the 
Protocol are now enormous events that bring together a broad range of non-traditional parties to 
discuss a wide range of responses to climate change.  Many of the principle players in climate 
litigation are also active in international negotiating and policy-making processes.  In the 
“epistemic community”40 that has emerged around climate negotiations, climate advocates find 
both a ready audience for spreading the news of litigation and for seeking the same goals that 
they are seeking through the litigation.  The CoP/MoP community is thus a critical venue for 
developing strategies, identifying partners, reaching out to the press, building legitimacy and 
credibility for the litigation, and developing factual experts that can help in the litigation.   
 For climate advocates, the CoP/MoP presents additional opportunities for pursing their 
specific goals and they actively seek to influence discussions at the negotiations.  The Inuit, for 
example, held “side-events” at three UNFCCC CoPs before filing their petition,41 and they chose 
the CoP as the place for formally announcing their intent to file the petition.  This brought attention 
to their claims and their concerns, both for the filing of the petition but also in the negotiations 
process as well.  So, too, the civil society coalition that submitted petitions to the World Heritage 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 3 (noting that a Minnesota climate regulation was a “statement of political 
opposition to ineffective national and global climate change policies”). 
40 See generally Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 
46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) (defining epistemic communities as “networks of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area.”); Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and 
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974).   According to these and other authors in 
international relations, the recurrent meetings of these epistemic communities at, for example, annual 
meetings of multilateral environmental regimes link government and non-government officials in a more 
effective and dynamic, long-term policymaking process.  
41 Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 117. 
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Committee, as well as the Secretary General of UNESCO, have held events at the UNFCCC CoP to 
highlight the impacts of climate change on World Heritage sites.42   
 High profile climate litigation strategies in the United States have also helped to undermine 
the U.S. opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, including particularly its efforts to derail the launch of 
negotiations for the second reporting period under Kyoto.  At the 2005 CoP/MoP in Montreal, the 
U.S. sought to enlist Australia, China and India in a united front against the European push for 
negotiations of future commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.  The U.S. strategy failed in part 
because of the multiplicity of U.S. voices at the negotiations (including local government officials, 
former President Bill Clinton, and several Senators) that argued action was occurring in the United 
States, that the Administration was isolated, and that the United States would likely engage in future 
international negotiations after the next President took office.43 The presence of high profile 
alternative U.S. voices and actions thus emboldened negotiators to set out a future negotiation 
schedule, more confident that the United States would eventually come back to the table. 
 Harder to judge is the impact climate litigation strategies will have on the climate change 
regime if many of these cases prove successful.  On one hand, taking climate change issues to other 
forums may seem to undermine the monopoly the climate secretariat might like to have on the 
issue.  On the other hand, by focusing other institutions on climate impacts, the actions may help 
petitioners to be more active and productive players in the climate negotiations and create 
mechanisms for the integration of the climate regime with other institutions (for example, human 
rights tribunals, financial institutions or other treaty regimes).  By forcing others institutions to take 
climate into account, climate litigation will create opportunities for policy coherence across 
international governance, even if through ad hoc cases.  Claims to the World Bank Inspection Panel 
or the International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, for example, could 
                                                 
42 Statement of Koichiro Matsuura, UNESCO Director General, to the 12th Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC  (Nov. 2006), available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/396/. 
43 See, e.g., Pew Center on Global Climate Change, COP 11 and COP/MOP 1 Montreal, available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_world/cop11/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 
2007); Andrew Buncombe & Geoffrey Lean, Climate campaigners claim greatest ever success at 
Montreal, THE INDEP., Dec. 11, 2006, available at  
http://news.independent.co.uk/environment/article332384.ece;  Planktos, Inc., The 2005 Montreal 
COP/MOP in Review, Dec. 15, 2005, available at 
http://www.planktos.com/Newsroom/The2005MontrealCOPMOPinReview.html; see also Int’l Inst. for 
Sustainable Dev., Special Report on Selected Side Events at COP 11 & Kyoto Protocol COP/MOP 1:  
Events Convened on Monday, 5 Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop11/enbots/enbots1707e.html (last visited on Apr. 23, 2007) (summarizing a 
panel on subnational initiatives including a presentation by  the N.Y. State Attorney General’s office 
regarding recent climate change cases brought in the United States). 
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seek to force those financial institutions to implement UNFCCC-approved methodologies for 
measuring, evaluating or reducing GHG emissions.44  
 The focus on remedies that is inherent to climate litigation may influence future debates at 
the UNFCCC over adaptation.  Certainly, the portrayal of specific harm to victims today, as 
opposed to general impacts tomorrow, is likely to force climate negotiators and the UNFCCC 
secretariat to focus on adaptation and compensation sooner than it otherwise would. This could 
increase funding available under the regime to respond to the needs of victims.  In the most extreme 
scenarios, the threat of civil liability could conceivably lead industry and others to promote a 
liability regime under the UNFCCC that would both clarify the rules of liability and essentially cap 
private sector liability—much as has been done with environmental damage from nuclear 
facilities45 and oil spills.46  
 The relationship between remedies in climate litigation and in the climate regime goes both 
ways.  Steps identified and supported by the UNFCCC may help shape remedies in climate 
litigation, which could remove a major obstacle for successful climate advocacy.  Some analysts, 
for example, have already proposed that remedies in climate litigation should include the 
requirement to buy carbon offsets endorsed in the climate regime.47  The climate regime may also 
be the appropriate forum for a broader remedial response for those who are victims of climate 
change.  If the number of climate refugees increases, for example from sea level rise, a more 
comprehensive UN remedial response may be necessary and would likely come under the auspices 
of the UNFCCC. Viewed in this light, the climate change litigation strategies are clearly supportive 
of and a potential catalyst for a stronger and more comprehensive UNFCCC regime.   
 
3.  Implications for International Law Generally 
                                                 
44See Jennifer Gleason & David Hunter, Bringing Climate Change Claims to the Accountability 
Mechanisms of the International Financial Institutions, in H. OSOFSY & W. BURNS, EDS.,  ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CONTROL:  SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (forthcoming 
Cambridge Press, 2007). 
45 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 
251; Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/500 (May 21, 1963) (entered into force Nov. 12, 1977); Brussels Convention 
Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material 
 (Dec. 17, 1971). 
46 Int’l Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3,  9 I.L.M. 45; 
Protocol of 1992 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution, 1971, Nov. 27, 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 373 (1996); Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources, Nov. 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1450. 
47 See Engels, supra note 4; see also Mandatory CO2 Credit Purchases Eyed as Remedy in Climate Change 
Suits, INSIDE EPA.COM (Nov. 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/news/Press/Engel112706-2.pdf (quoting proposal from Kirsten Engels).   
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3.1.  Promoting the Progressive Development of International Law  
 Whether international law will evolve to address climate change impacts effectively is still 
an open question, but just the act of filing climate-based petitions or complaints advances 
innovative arguments and pushes international law in new directions.  The Inuit petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, for example, requires the interpretation and application 
of rights to the use and enjoyment of traditional lands, to the benefits of culture, to property, to the 
preservation of health, life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and to 
residence, movement, and inviolability of the home.48  The petition invites the Commission to 
continue its recent jurisprudence extending the Inter-American system’s human rights protections to 
the intersection of human rights and the environment.49  The Inuit petition also presents important 
and well-supported arguments for the progressive development of international environmental law, 
including specific reference to U.S. obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and to 
emerging principles of law, including the principle not to cause transboundary environmental harm, 
the principle of sustainable development, and the principle of precaution.50  Even if the Commission 
(as now seems likely) will not pursue the Petition, both the Petition and the ensuing dialogue at the 
Commission will further the potential future interpretation of the links between international 
environmental and human rights law.   
 These initial efforts to use new areas of the law, such as the law relating to human rights or 
cultural heritage, may spawn other innovative efforts to build policy coherence between different 
fields of international law and climate change.  On April 17, 2007, for example, the UN Security 
Council held its first briefing on the security implications of climate change.  That sparked 
significant attention to the important linkages between climate change and national security.51 The 
links between climate change and other fields of international law have triggered substantial 
scholarship as well as potentially innovative litigation strategies, including links between climate 
change and international trade law,52 the law of the sea and fisheries conservation,53 international 
                                                 
48 Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 74-95; see also Osofsky, The Inuit Petition, supra note 4 (discussing the 
human rights and environment linkages in the Inuit claim). 
49 See, e.g., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni, Judgment,  2001 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); see also Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Nov. 14, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 
161 (1989). 
50 Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 97-101. 
51 See, e.g., U.N. Council Hits Impasse Over Debate on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/18nations.html; Andrew Revkin & Timothy Williams, Global 
Warming Called Security Threat, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, at 25, col. 4. 
52See, e.g., Andrew Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States in International Forums for Global 
Warming Emissions, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10185 (2003); Andrew Strauss, The Case for 
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finance,54 coporate social responsibility,55 and the international protection of wetlands.56 Taken 
collectively, these efforts not only explore new aspects of their respective fields, but contribute 
substantially to building policy and legal coherence between the fields of international law—an 
outcome that is important for sustainable development generally and for international responses to 
climate change more specifically. 
 
3. 2. Strengthening International Institutions 
 One of the most important outcomes of the current climate litigation strategies is that they 
may strengthen certain international institutions simply by using them.  The question of whether or 
how existing international institutions can address what may be the most important environmental 
question of our time speaks to the relevance of the institutions themselves.  If an institution with an 
environmental mandate, or at least some relationship to sustainable development, cannot be called 
into service to address an issue of the magnitude of climate change, what is its relevance more 
generally?   
 Appealing to the World Heritage Convention, for example, shines the spotlight on that 
Convention and enables UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee to raise the importance of 
protecting world heritage sites from climate threats.  Such petitions bring attention to the 
Convention and force the governments to address the impacts of climate change on cultural and 
natural heritage.  They also provide an opportunity for the Committee to demonstrate its relevance 
and that of the World Heritage Convention to modern threats, like climate change, that arise 
indirectly from the processes of globalization and industrialization as opposed to direct, deliberate 
choices by individual host governments or corporations.  Even if the ultimate decision of the 
Commission (to reject the petitions and adopt a more general strategy for addressing climate change 
threats to cultural heritage) was likely a politically motivated compromise, it may nonetheless 
                                                                                                                                                 
Utilizing the World Trade Organization as a Forum for Global Environmental Regulation, 3 WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J.  309 (1998).  
53 See William C.G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 34-38 (Winter, 2007); William C.G. 
Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in International Fora: The Law of the Sea 
Convention, 1(2) J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 27-51 (2006). 
54 See Gleason & Hunter, supra note 41.  
55 See Cornelia Heydenreich, Germanwatch Raises Complaint against Volkswagen: Climate Damaging 
Business Strategy Violates OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Germanwatch Briefing Paper, 
May 2007, available at http://www.germanwatch.org/corp/vw-hg07e.pdf; Beschwerde gegen die 
Volkswagen AG unter den OECD-Leitsatzen fur Multinationale Unternehmen, May 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.germanwatch.org/corp/vw-besch.pdf (petition filed in Germany challenging on climate change 
grounds Volkswagen’s operations as violating the OECD guidelines on multinational enterprises).  
56 Delmar Blasco, Secretary General of the Convention on Wetlands, Statement to the 6th Conference of 
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Den Haag, The Netherlands, 
(Nov. 20, 2000). 
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provide the Committee with a long-term platform to highlight links between climate change and 
cultural heritage.  By showing some well-reasoned restraint in expanding its scope to embrace 
climate change, it may strengthen the long-term credibility and trust the Committee has with 
member governments, while still garnering support from the petitioners and civil society 
organizations.57   
The same can be said for the petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  
The petition helps further the Commission’s reach to situations other than traditional civil and 
political rights.  Although the Commission has initially rejected the petition for providing 
insufficient information to demonstrate a violation of the American Convention,58 the petition did 
prompt the Commission to hold, and invite the petitioners to, an unprecedented hearing on the 
“relationship between human rights and global warming.”59  Like the World Heritage Committee’s 
approach described above, this response appears to be a compromise that keeps the door open for 
the Commission to continue to explore climate change in the context of the InterAmerican 
commitments to human rights. The Commission’s reach is thus extended to embrace climate 
change, albeit not yet through a formal, expansive interpretation of the underlying legal instruments.   
 To some extent these cross-over petitions—i.e., those that make international institutions 
address an issue (climate change) that is normally outside of their respective mandates—positions 
the institutions to be more relevant for the complexities of sustainable development more generally.  
Thus, invitations to address the intersection of human rights and climate at the Inter-American 
Commission, trade and climate at the WTO, or finance and climate in the case of the IFI 
accountability mechanisms, are invitations for these institutions to show that they can address the 
complex and integrated aspects of contemporary sustainable development issues. 
 
4.  Strengthening the Democratization of Global Environmental Governance 
 Climate litigation at all levels is democratizing global environmental law and policy 
making.  Although the scale, scope, and methods of participation by civil society in the formal 
climate negotiations have been substantial, at the end of the day everything from the agenda to the 
final outcome of international treaty negotiations—and the climate change regime is no exception—
                                                 
57 See, e.g., UNESCO Adopts Climate Change Strategy for World Heritage Sites, ENV’T NEWS SERV., July 
11, 2006 (quoting several petitioners supportive of the Committee). 
58 See Letter from the Organization of American States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al, regarding Petition No. 
P-1413-05 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf. 
59 Letter from the Organization of American States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al, regarding Global 
Warming and Human Rights Hearing (Feb. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-inuit-
invite.pdf. 
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is appropriately monopolized by governments.  Civil society can observe, propose, pressure, prod, 
and even parody, but ultimately its role in international negotiations is limited.   
 Not so in terms of litigation.  Climate change litigation empowers civil society to shape the 
agenda in ways not allowed in formal negotiations.  It was civil society, for example, that put 
climate change on the agenda of the World Heritage Committee and the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission.  Approval to file the petitions was not solicited nor needed, from either the 
governments or the relevant international institutions.  Civil society’s exercise of this agenda-
creating authority contributes to the ongoing changes seen in who participates and influences 
international policy.  
 Climate litigation at the national level also helps to democratize climate policy.   
National level claimants are putting climate change on their national policy agendas.  Clearly, this is 
the case in the United States where subnational government units (e.g., the states of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and California, as well as municipalities, e.g., Oakland, California and Boulder, 
Colorado), frustrated with the lack of federal action, have taken strong action on climate change—
thus expressing their keen interest in participating and shaping climate policy.60  Similarly, 
Australian civil society claimants have put climate change on the agenda of otherwise reluctant 
government agencies.61  Although legal actions, these were also political statements intended to 
pressure the respective governments on climate change and to show the world that at the 
subnational level, at least, many in the United States and Australia support stronger actions on 
climate change.   
 
 5.1.  Transnational Climate Advocacy Networks 
   Climate litigation efforts are also changing the nature and scope of transnational advocacy 
networks focused on climate change.  The existence of such networks is now widely recognized as 
having significant influence on environmental governance.62  Climate change policy, generally, 
benefits from what is among the most well-networked and cooperative of all transnational 
environmental advocacy movements.  Climate change has been a global policymaking priority for 
more than fifteen years now, and the depth, sophistication and trust that has built up in transnational 
climate advocacy networks is unprecedented in international environmental governance.  Climate 
                                                 
60 See Connecticut v. AEP Complaint, supra note 5 (plaintiffs include nine states); Friends of the Earth v. 
Watson, 2005 WL 2035596 (2005) (plaintiffs include Boulder, Colorado; Arcata, California; and Oakland, 
California); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 43ASTAN. 
J. INT’L L. / 26A STAN. J. ENVTL L. (forthcoming 2007). 
61 Australian Conservation Foundation, VCAT 2029. 
62 See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:  LITIGATION 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
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negotiations are host to literally thousands of civil society representatives. The Climate Action 
Network (CAN), a major network for organizing and coordinating civil society input into the 
climate negotiations boasts 365 non-governmental organizations as members and seven regional 
offices around the world;63 it is well organized and very visible at the negotiations.    
For the most part, the Climate Action Network (CAN) and its affiliated organizations and 
networks have focused their work on influencing the international negotiations, but the advent of 
the climate litigation strategies outlined in this book reveal a subtle, but important, shift in the 
strategies and scope of the climate advocacy networks.   This shift entails a greater focus on 
litigation and advocating for specific remedies for particular harms, an extension to multiple forums 
beyond the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties, and the inclusion of new advocacy organizations 
with a clearer focus on legal strategies.  The climate litigation network is now its own transnational 
network, albeit arguably a subset of the broader climate networks exemplified by CAN.   An 
advocacy statement calling for the national and international enforcement of climate-related laws, 
for example, was explicitly endorsed by nearly 75 advocates from 26 countries; this reflects both 
global support and cooperation in the strategy of bringing climate litigation claims.64
Although it may be too soon to predict, the cooperation in sharing information, strategies 
and expertise that is evident in the emerging climate litigation strategies—seen perhaps most readily 
in the coordinated efforts to file claims under the World Heritage Convention—may herald a new 
era of transnational cooperation that is designed less for influencing broad international policy and 
more in using domestic and national forums to bring coordinated impact litigation.  This 
collaborative advocacy will both strengthen the individual cases, but will also serve to highlight the 
need for a global response.  Such a coordinated and integrated litigation strategy, which is emerging 
in climate change, could also appear in the future with other global environmental issues such as 
ozone depletion, mercury pollution, or fisheries losses.   
 
Conclusion 
 It is hard to judge how much, if at all, the pressure from climate change litigation will 
contribute to broader changes in climate policy, but it certainly is influencing the debate.  Many of 
the climate advocates that have brought actions thus far have been motivated substantially (if not 
primarily) by the goal of raising the profile of climate change in the hopes of building political will 
to force more ambitious efforts to address the issue.  Certainly, the state attorneys general who 
brought climate-related claims in the United States did so at least partly to pressure for national or 
                                                 
63 See http://www.climatenetwork.org. 
64 See http://www.climatelaw.org. 
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state-wide climate policies.  In California, for example, the litigation was one piece of a multi-part 
effort to move forward on climate change, which has included setting ambitious emission reduction 
targets, issuing new fuel efficiency standards and establishing the framework for a cap-and-trade 
program for greenhouse gases.65   
Much of the litigation is directly aimed at forcing political action.  The Inuit petition to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was aimed at using the moral and political 
persuasion of a formal human rights finding to isolate the United States and build both international 
and domestic pressure on the government to take stronger action. Domestic actions in the United 
States, Germany and Australia, for example, have also sought to compel government actions 
relating to climate change.66  These actions range from requirements to assess climate impacts at the 
project level,67 to incorporate climate change into public financing decisions,68 or to compel 
government agencies to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as injurious 
pollutants.69  Even when domestic actions fail, they may indirectly build pressure for legislative and 
policy action.  In the United States, for example, dismissal of the Connecticut v. AEP complaint on 
political question grounds put the spotlight on the political branches of government for a solution. 
Climate litigation also ripples through the private sector, receiving the attention of 
industries that have potential exposure to climate liability.  Plaintiff-side tort lawyers are talented, 
resourceful, patient, and well-financed, and many of them believe climate change either now or in 
the future will present very real opportunities for successful litigation.70  In response, corporations 
and their attorneys now speak openly about the emerging “litigation risk” from climate change.71   
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. State Code, Div. 1, Sec. 38500 (2006). 
66 See generally Smith & Shearman, supra note 3. 
67 Australian Conservation Foundation v. Minister for Planning, Administrative Decision, (2004) VCAT 
2029.   
68 Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, No. C02-4106 JSW, 2007 WL 962955 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007); 
Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).  
69 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1438 (2007)  
70 See, e.g., David Grossman, Warming Up To A Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change 
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9-33 (2003); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global 
Warming as a Public Nuisance:  Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
407 (2005). 
71 See, e.g.,Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation 
Against Corporate Defendants, 35 ENV’T  REP. (BNA) 2365 (Nov. 12, 2004) (“Despite the uncertainties, it 
may not be too early to prepare for the possibility of litigation.  Next steps for potential defendants may 
include a preliminary risk assessment of their exposure to litigation and potential defenses….”); Global 
Warming:  Here Come the Lawyers, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2006 (quoting Kevin Healy, a partner with 
the law firm of Bryan Cave, that in the wake of recently filed lawsuits he now advises corporate clients that 
they need to take “reasonable” steps to pare back emissions to reduce their legal exposure); Kristin Choo, 
Feeling the Heat:  The Growing Debate over Climate Change Takes on Legal Overtones, A.B.A.  J., 29, 30,  
July 2006 (quoting Prof. John Dernbach: “The prospect of liability is a serious matter for people who 
understand climate change and take it seriously.”); Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean Hecht, Limiting 
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Major U.S. law firms now routinely market their abilities and successes in climate litigation,72 and 
litigation (and the related regulatory) risk are important factors in motivating companies to take 
proactive steps to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and related climate impacts.73   
Thus, the turn to climate litigation and related litigation is reshaping how we think and 
respond to the climate change challenge—regardless of whether individual cases prevail.  But, of 
course, climate change advocates hope to win.  They seek specific and far-reaching remedies.  The 
Inuit Petition, for example, seeks to have a plan established and implemented to protect Inuit culture 
and resources, including, inter alia, the land, water, snow, ice, and plant and animal species used or 
occupied by the Inuit.74 The State Attorneys General in Connecticut v. AEP seek to have the courts 
impose a cap on greenhouse gas emissions from the five single largest emitting utilities in the 
United States.75  The State of California seeks compensation for costs it is already incurring from 
climate change.76  These are substantial remedies that would not only improve the plight of the 
specific plaintiffs, but would also make important contributions to the climate policy debate.  
Obviously, a court’s use of its injunctive powers could lead to direct emissions reductions in the 
United States, but so too would a monetary damage judgment, which would reverberate throughout 
the private industry sector, forcing corporations to take proactive steps to reduce their exposure to 
climate liability. 
Nor are victories in climate litigation a chimera. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which will force EPA to revisit whether to regulate carbon under the Clean 
Air Act, is the most well known climate victory. In so doing, the Supreme Court found that the risk 
of rising sea levels alleged by the plaintiffs was sufficiently “real” to afford Massachusetts standing 
to raise its climate change-based claim.77  Other courts in the US and Australia, for example, have 
extended standing to private parties pressing climate change claims.78  Significant substantive 
                                                                                                                                                 
Liability in the Greenhouse:  Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate 
Change, 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. / 26A STAN. J. ENVTL L.  251, 274 (forthcoming 2007). 
72See, e.g., Sidley Austin, LLP, Climate Change Advisory Nov. 21, 2006, available                                  at 
http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/ClimateChangeUpdate11.21.06.pdf(. 
73 See THE CLIMATE GROUP, CARBON DOWN, PROFITS UP (2d ed., 2005) (compiling an extensive list of 
voluntary emissions targets accepted by corporations). 
74 Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 118. 
75 Australian Conservation Foundation, VCAT 2029. 
76 Mosbacher, 2007 WL 962955 (rejecting summary judgment motion in a case arguing that the US 
Overseas Private Insurance Company must conduct an assessment of the climate impacts of the projects 
they finance); Watson, 2005 WL 2035596 (same). 
77 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1438, 1455-56 (2007) 
78  Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d  957 (holding that plaintiff environmental organization had 
standing to challenge a permit application that would have permitted significant releases of a potent 
greenhouse gas (HCFC-142b)); Watson, 2005 WL 2035596 (upholding standing of environmental 
organization to bring a case seeking that a US government agency include climate change in their 
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victories have also required, for example, the assessment of climate impacts in the permitting of 
greenhouse gas emitting activities,79 in decisions to provide financing,80 and in requirements to 
reduce gas flaring associated with oil refineries.81  These victories are likely just the tip of the 
litigation iceberg, but win or lose, climate litigation strategies have harkened in a new era of climate 
politics.  
                                                                                                                                                 
environmental assessments).  But see Korsinsky, 2005 WL 2414744 (rejecting standing of an individual in a 
climate change tort action). . 
79 See, e.g., Australian Conservation Foundation, VCAT 2029. 
80 Mosbacher, 2007 WL 962955 (rejecting summary judgment motion in a case arguing that the US 
Overseas Private Insurance Company must conduct an assessment of the climate impacts of the projects 
they finance); Watson, 2005 WL 2035596; Bund & Germanwatch v. German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour [BMWA], Beschluss, Verwaltungsgericht [VG Berlin] [Local Administrative 
Court] Jan. 10, 2006, VG 10 A 215.04 (2006), translated at 
http://www.climatelaw.org/media/Germany/de.export.decision.eng.doc. 
81 Climate Justice Programme, Court Orders Nigerian Gas Flaring to Stop (Nov. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.snm.nl/pdf/0500_2.7_court_orders_nigarian_flaring_to_stop__background_paper.pdf. 
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